OECD - Nuclear Energy in Perspective

The OECD has released an informative nuclear energy summary, Nuclear Energy and Addressing Climate Change. The document is only 8 pages (with figures and tables), but it efficiently addresses the following questions:

• Does nuclear power produce CO2 emissions?


• To what extent is nuclear energy used now?


• Can nuclear power capacity be expanded quickly?


• Are supplies of nuclear fuel adequate?


• What about safety, waste and proliferation concerns?

Thorium - addressing non-proliferation and waste management

Thorium Power Ltd. has been working for years to develop a solution to what are often sited as the two remaining challenges facing the global nuclear industry, waste management and non-proliferation.

Thorium fuel is interesting for Australian nuclear ambitions. Not only could it help mitigate the issues above, but it could enable India to achieve it's own nuclear ambitions without the pressure on Australia and other Uranium suppliers. Thorium is about three times more abundant and can be used directly without enrichment - India has plenty of its own [estimated at 13% of global thorium resources].

Thorium does have its own challenges to overcome in the short term. For example, the very features that make it so proliferation resistant [a number of highly radioactive, short lived byproducts] also make processing and recovery of the U-233 fuel difficult. Hence a lot of research in being conducted into developing long life, self breeding fuel assembly designs where processing is not required.

A recent press release of interest.

MCLEAN, VA, Dec 31, 2007 (MARKET WIRE via COMTEX News Network) -- Thorium Power, Ltd. (OTCBB: THPW), the leading developer of low-waste, non-proliferative nuclear fuel technology for existing and future reactors, today announced that a new formal agreement has been reached with Russia's Kurchatov Institute relating to the irradiation testing program for the Company's fuel designs, which has been ongoing since 2002. The agreement assigns to Thorium Power Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Thorium Power, Ltd., the worldwide rights, title and interest in and to the technical data generated from the ampoule irradiation testing of seed and blanket fuel samples in the Kurchatov research reactor over the past two years.

Andrey Mushakov, Thorium Power's Executive Vice President for International Nuclear Operations, stated: "The agreement reconfirms our strategic development relationship with the Kurchatov Institute, one of Russia's premier nuclear research institutes. Ampoule irradiation testing is a critical, long lead-time activity in our comprehensive program of technology testing and demonstration activities and it is a vital process that new fuel designs must perform as part of a fuel qualification and regulatory licensing process. The ampoule irradiation testing work continues as expected at the Kurchatov Institute, and this agreement formalizes our rights to valuable technical data necessary for regulatory licensing of our commercial fuel designs."

Seth Grae, Thorium Power's CEO, added: "This agreement continues the excellent working relationship that we have had with the Kurchatov Institute and the Russian government for over a decade. The work under this agreement is an important step towards the demonstration of our fuel designs in a full scale commercial reactor."

About Thorium Power, Ltd.

Based in McLean, VA, Thorium Power, Ltd. is a nuclear energy pioneer and the leading provider of low-waste, non-proliferative nuclear fuel technology for existing and future reactors. The Company's technologies include nuclear fuel designs optimized to address key concerns about traditional nuclear power, including nuclear proliferation and nuclear waste. Thorium Power plans to license its technologies to commercial and government owned reactor operators and nuclear fuel fabricators aiming to benefit from thorium-based fuels. The Company is targeting new reactors in countries without a nuclear industry today, as well as currently operating and new reactors in countries with an established industry. Thorium Power is also leveraging its nuclear technology, business and regulatory expertise and relationships by offering services to commercial entities and governments looking to establish or expand nuclear industry capabilities and infrastructure. In addition to leveraging its International and Technical Advisory Boards comprised of key national and international leaders in the fields of nuclear energy, finance, government affairs, non-proliferation and diplomacy, the Company maintains long-standing relationships with leading Russian nuclear entities, providing expert resources and facilities for its nuclear fuel development activities. To support the implementation of its business model, Thorium Power has plans to form partnerships with various types of participants in the nuclear industry, allowing the Company to address multiple nuclear reactor types internationally.

DISCLAIMER

This press release may include certain statements that are not descriptions of historical facts, but are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements may include the description of our plans and objectives for future operations, assumptions underlying such plans and objectives, statements regarding benefits of the new agreement with Kurchatov and other statements identified by forward-looking terminology such as "may," "expects," "believes," "anticipates," "intends," "expects," "projects" or similar terms, variations of such terms or the negative of such terms. There are a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from the forward-looking statements made herein. Such information is based upon various assumptions made by, and expectations of, our management that were reasonable when made but may prove to be incorrect. All of such assumptions are inherently subject to significant economic and competitive uncertainties and contingencies beyond our control and upon assumptions with respect to the future business decisions which are subject to change. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that actual results will meet expectations and actual results may vary (perhaps materially) from certain of the results anticipated herein. Reference is made to the risk factors contained in our latest annual report as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These factors may cause actual results to vary from the forward-looking statements contained in this release.

Further Information:

ANA / UIC - Thorium briefing paper

WNA - Thorium

Energy from thorium

Risks and Realities: The “New Nuclear Energy Revival”

A well balanced and highly informative piece from Sharon Squassoni from the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . Her report also includes numerous references.

See the full report here.

Last week's video - Nuclear debate in early 2006

I'll store the video from last week here for history along with the original comment I made.

Note this 'discussion' [the host, Stewart Brand, is reluctant to refer to it to a debate] took place in the very beginning of 2006 - over a full year before I even started this blog. Certainly A LOT has changed since then technologically, socially and politically. [Catch Schwartz's scepticism regarding whether the Bush administration would ever acknowledge climate change and yet here we are.]

The pro-nuclear argument is presented by Peter Schwartz - an environmental scientist with a fluid mechanics background. The opposing view is presented by Schwartz’s friend/foe Ralph Cavanagh, an attorney from the National Resources Defence Council. I don't know if I would have the courage to trade points with an attorney, but good on Schwartz for having a go.

I would like to point out a few interesting aspects of the discussion. First, Schwartz's perspective - as pointed out by Stewart Brand - is more global; second, Cavanagh accuses Schwartz of 'wishing' for advanced technologies that may or may not come to fruition and raises the 'spectres' of waste, proliferation, etc. without providing any tangible [i.e. quantifiable] detail of his own points [e.g. a purely 'renewable' solution]; and third Cavanagh claims nuclear is a historically competitive loser in the open market system - while California remains in the midst of a 30 year ban on nuclear development.

Please, watch and enjoy with the 20/20 hindsight of over 20 months' history.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)

What does this mean for Australia, the United States, and other developing and developed ‘partners’? That’s a tough question to address in one post – but I’m getting a bit busy and new posts may be scarce for a while. So I’ll do my best.

During the recent 48th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management conference in Tucson Arizona, there was considerable attention given to the GNEP. Both the first speaker in the opening plenary [Dr. Paul Lisowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fuel Cycle Management, Office of Nuclear Energy, US Dept. of Energy [DoE]] as well as the last speaker of the final plenary [Adam Scheinman, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Non-proliferation and International Security, US DoE, National Nuclear Security Administration] emphasised the role of GNEP including progress with countries including Russia, China, Japan, France, etc. Additionally, three technical sessions were devoted to GNEP. These included 6 panels and about 20 individual presentations from both government and industry.

As one looks beyond the marketing of GNEP it becomes obvious that the programme faces some significant challenges [beyond the funding problems being imposed by the US congress]. Few people have much to say about the strategic goals of the programme: to promote global energy security and reduce dependence on climate killing fossil fuels through the dramatic expansion of no/low emission nuclear technology. Furthermore that nuclear technology will be expanded in a way that minimises proliferation risk and drastically reduces the long-term repository burden from high level waste.

However, with respect to tactical implementation, the waters begin to muddy. My understanding is:

1. Non-proliferation goals of the US [as well as just about any other country in charge of its mental faculties] would be achieved through the voluntary agreement of ‘recipient’ or ‘partner’ countries to forego nuclear fuel enrichment based on long-term fuel supply assurances from a collective group of fuel supplier [aka fuel cycle] states [mostly those who already have nuclear weapon capabilities, with possibly a few others].

2. Fuel supplier states would become involved in fuel reprocessing to generate fuel for fast burner reactors. These reactors would digest the minor actinides and transuranics. The remaining residual waste will decay to the level of naturally background uranium in about 300 years [as opposed to about 350,000 years for high level wast coming out of today’s nuclear reactors]. Since humans have demonstrated our ability to design and build civil structures capable of lasting well beyond 300 years for several millennia now; confidence is very high in our ability to keep this waste ‘tight’ for 3 centuries.

Also during the conference, there were several scientific presentations explaining the PUREX flow-sheets – plutonium is never separated.

3. Partnering nations, those who are not enriching but receiving fuel from supplier states would benefit through security of fuel supply and an agreement that the supplier states would take back the fuel for reprocessing.

A point made by many is that the real challenge rests at the back end of the fuel cycle [waste]. If GNEP can’t offer anything new there, then it really isn’t offering much at all. For example, provided a country remains within the good graces of the UN Security Council, they currently have no problem getting a reactor and fuel through the industrial partners in existence today [Westinghouse, AREVA, GE, etc.]. GNEP doesn’t offer much new in this regard. However, through GNEP as it is defined today, some of the old significant challenges still remain. Unless something novel is proposed for the back end, states will still have to develop a long-term, high-level waste solution for the residual waste post-reprocessing. [The US has no policy to keep all this waste.] Individual, high level nuclear waste repositories are simply not an option for small, developing states.

Some opportunities for Australia.

Get back into enrichment

Presentations involving enrichment at this conference show expected demand increasing dramatically over the coming years together with some older enrichment capacity that must be upgraded or replaced in the near future. Several companies are already expanding their enrichment services to meet projected demand. Presentations included the status of the new National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico being constructed by Louisiana Enrichment Services. But there appears to be scope for more.

However, while Australia has proven our scientific ability relating to enrichment, we lack any demonstrated industrial capacity in this regard. Is it reasonable to think we can fast-track our related scientific achievements to an industrial capacity in time to meet the demand [and with competing countries and companies already moving in this area]? Partnering with existing companies to host facilities of their design and technology may be more reasonable.

There may also be advantages to becoming an enrichment state, eventually supplying our own fuel for example.

Reprocess & Burn

With enrichment, Australia may also then get into reprocessing and fast burner industries. Again, to me this seems a HUGE industrial leap, especially when the high level schedule/implementation ambitions of the GNEP programme are considered. Australia has no technology base with respect to the design of nuclear reactor facilities [ even OPAL was Argentinean design]. I doubt countries/companies in possession of such technology would be eager to export it. This is probably the least likely activity to be seen domestically in Australia.

Long Term Waste Management

Here, Australia could take advantage of the starkest features of our country – vast emptiness, extreme isolation and geologic stability. If there was ever an opportunity to see emptiness and isolation as a resource, the nuclear fuel cycle is it.

Compact to begin with, spent nuclear fuel is rarely seen as waste any longer. Trends are definitely moving toward reprocessing, with new reactor designs aiming to burn recycled fuel – supported by research in Japan for example as well as ongoing recycling/reprocessing activities in many countries around the world [several of these countries are in the midst of expanding their capabilities in this regard]. But the final waste from reprocessing activities still needs a home. As I mentioned above, this final waste will be of significantly lower volume, lower activity and generate less heat. In a few hundred years it will achieve the same activity as the uranium under our feet at this very moment.

Should Australia consider and eventually agree to host such a site for, as an example, participating GNEP countries [a ‘supranational repository’]; the boost to that endeavour would be considerable. The international demand for such services could result in tremendous benefits for Australia. This is worthy of serious consideration – particularly when you consider that we will need a waste storage facility [or certainly access to such services] to handle the output from our use of lifesaving radio-pharmaceuticals as well as other non-power nuclear industrial products.

This is not a new topic to Australia, as discussed in this radio interview from 1999. But with reprocessing, we are speaking of a different breed of horse altogether.

So in conclusion, GNEP is not a ‘gate’ between countries and nuclear power, but rather one of several paths to obtain it. As it is being promoted at the moment, choosing this path will be 100% voluntary. Therefore, if it is to achieve the ambitious strategic goals mentioned above [as well as at the conference], GNEP MUST become the path of least resistance as perceived by non-nuclear states with nuclear power ambitions. This certainly seems improbable without a long term solution to the final waste streams, and in particular, highly active waste.

Australia and the nuclear fuel cycle

We have a considerable number of nuclear related decisions to make in the near future.

First, we can remain - quite simply - a uranium supplier. With their recent decision to kill the antiquated and irrelevant 3-mines policy, Labor has pretty much assured this will be Australia's minimum involvement in the global nuclear fuel cycle.

Or, we could supply the world [or rather those parts of it that we get on well with] with uranium and construct some nuclear power plants ourselves. Others would complete the enrichment and fuel fabrication for us. As we so often allow to happen, we would be purchasing back a finished product principally derived from resources shipped from our shores.

In taking on these options, we would have to develop a high-level [i.e. used fuel] strategy. Several countries, including Japan, the UK, France and Russia reprocess their waste. There are also talks of advanced 'burner' reactors to consume the worst fission byproducts - but these are still in the development stage. Research, however is accelerating. Nevertheless, while recycling/reprocessing technologies greatly reduce the activity and heat burden of the waste, they do not - currently - eliminate it entirely requiring some sort of final repository.

Next, we could develop enrichment technology. As is currently being at least contemplated if not whole heartedly pursued. This decision is a complicated one as it involves due consideration for Australia's domestic and global responsibilities.

As the world shifts its support in favour of nuclear power, concerns over nuclear non-proliferation as well as technology and fuel access by all interested countries must be addressed equitably and in a mutual context. I believe this is the principal selling point for both the GNEP as well as Valdimir Putin's equivalent initiative from within the Russian Federation. A main aspect of these programmes is a multilateral fuel cycle where enrichment, fuel fabrication, fuel utilization, and final disposal may or may not occur within the same country. The multilateral programme advocates and potential participants [sensitive to, for example, Russia's apparent willingness to use fuel as an instrument of economic policy] seek a nuclear fuel bank to ensure the security of fuel availability from multiple participants. If such a programme is not developed, then crises similar to those in North Korea and Iran will continue to occur as countries justify their pursuit of enrichment as a means to energy security. With possible results similar to the [thankfully mostly botched] nuclear detonation in North Korea in late 2006.

Ideally I would love to keep the enrichment process confined to existing nuclear weapons states. But considering all states with demonstrated or suspected nuclear weapons capability USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel [not admitted], North Korea [? debatable], I am not convinced they represent a completely desirable set of contributors to an international nuclear fuel suppliers network - at least from the perspectives from many nations around the world. There are some countries without weapons, but capable of enrichment that may also be considered. These include South Africa who had weapons but gave them up as well as Brazil and possibly others. But still I believe many nations are looking for any international fuel centre to acquire further capacity without sacrificing security. I've already discussed Russia above. France can be economically fickle and the UK - while looking to build more nuclear power plants - has been recently working to back out of the nuclear, commercial infrastructure game.

To provide more confidence, the programmes are looking to broaden their bank of suppliers, while keeping the list of weapons states to a minimum. This is probably why Australia has been invited to join the GNEP and a principal reason our representatives are taking trips to Russia.

All this leads us ultimately back to waste. Countries who supply enriched uranium may [yes I said may] be asked to take the high level waste back. But further than this, we must consider Australia itself - vast, geologically stable with huge, uninhabited stretches of land. This continent is a resource that - if properly managed - could serve a significantly greater good.

Therefore if we wish to engage further in the nuclear fuel cycle, a high level waste repository is one of several desirable prerequisites. Hence the government's pursuit of it.

Keep in mind though that these options/decisions are not firmly tied to each other. For example, Australia could embrace nuclear power without enrichment or, possibly, the need for a final waste repository [if one argues that we may have to accept the waste of others, they must therefore concede that our waste may be accepted elsewhere]. We could enrich without generating nuclear electricity or we could become an international, high level waste repository state without generating power or the pursuit of enrichment.

Because of Australia's positive relationship with the IAEA, history of smooth and compliant inspections etc. We have gained a broad and positive international reputation. I believe this is why we are getting nods from a variety of stakeholders as we go around the world dipping our feet in the proverbial nuclear pool. The key players know us and consider us trustworthy.

Australia's options are - for the moment - completely open.

Experts Begin In Adelaide

In Adelaide this week, experts are meeting to ponder the future of nuclear power. From ABC Radio:

The Adelaide meeting has certainly drawn some big hitters from the Australian and international nuclear scene. Experts from China, the United States, India and Japan as well as Australia will be looking at the potential nuclear energy has to reduce greenhouse gases, and at what a sharp rise in the number of reactors in Australia and worldwide would mean for global agreements on non-proliferation. The chairman of the meeting is arms control expert Professor Richard Leaver of Flinders University. He says the Switkowski recommendations are unlikely to be fully implemented in Australia.

Listen to the entire interview with Professor Leaver.

Australia, possibly the world is at a nuclear crossroads. Where the nuclear renaissance meets modern concerns about proliferation. Proliferation is indeed a challenge, but not a show stopper according to most experts. This is being discussed on ABC Radio by Australia's Defence Minister, Dr Brendan Nelson; Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Also The Economist is discussing the modern 'China Syndrome' [as in pointing to China as an excuse to continue the indiscriminate dumping of toxic fossil fuel waste into the atmosphere]. Turns out China's per-capita emissions stand at 3.6 tonnes per person as opposed to Australia's reported 19.4 or the United States' 20.2. [Why should I be entitled to spew out over 5 times the emissions than Joe 'Chin' Bloggs in China?]

But what is China doing about this...? continuing to deploy a diverse array of low/no carbon emission energy technologies including... you guessed it, nuclear.

Much of [the planned deployment of renewable energy production technology] will come from hydroelectric power. But China is also the world's fifth-biggest user of wind turbines, and the biggest consumer of the sort of solar panels used to heat water.

Greater use of nuclear power should also help reduce China's emissions. The government is building four new nuclear reactors, and earlier this year placed an order for another four—a far more ambitious construction programme than any other country save Russia.

Green nuclear power coming to Norway

As reported by Cosmos Magazine:

Image courtesy of Cosmos Magazine & Justin Randall

Norway remains quite active in the areas (among others) of nuclear non-proliferation, energy security, and global environmental stewardship. Norwegians - specifically - are looking to Thorium based nuclear power technology to solve the overlapping problems of all three after Norway's state-owned energy company, Statkraft, this week announced plans to investigate building a thorium-fuelled nuclear reactor.

Some relevant highlights of the technology:

• The reaction is 'driven' by a nuclear accelerator (called an Accelerator Driven Sub-critical (ADS) system, and therefore can not maintain a self-sustained nuclear reaction [improved safety].
• ADS technology can be used to 'burn' waste products from existing nuclear reactors. Relevant studies were completed for example as part of the US Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative [waste management and proliferation avoidance].
• The technology produces significantly less high level waste.(see 'New age nuclear', Cosmos, issue 8) [waste minimisation and management].
• Byproducts of the Thorium reaction do not include materials that pose increased weapons proliferation risks (Plutonium and Uranium) [non-proliferation].
• Thorium is significantly more abundant than Uranium and does not require high-tech enrichment technologies [sustainability, energy security and non-proliferation]. [Enrichment being the central issue responsible for the dramas in Iran at the moment, for example.]

The article also discusses an amazing flop in Norwegian public opinion in less than a year, with 80% now favouring Thorium nuclear technology development. [All emphasis is mine]

"It would be a sin of omission not to consider it," said Bård Mikkelsen, CEO of Statkraft, in an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet.

"Norway has taken the lead on this. We are an energy nation; we have large supplies of thorium – not as much as Australia of course – but we have a very advanced energy industry, and we have a responsibility to the world," said Lillestøl [a nuclear physicist at the University of Bergen, Norway]. "Without nuclear energy we will destroy the world, we will spend all the coal, oil and gas, and we will be left with an energy desert."

As with other things nuclear, there are industrial opportunities and interest within Australia. But one quoted Sydney nuclear scientist expressed his doubts about Australian political will and research resource commitment, claiming Australia is 'lagging behind' while European Union, India, the US, Japan and Russia all work to develop thorium energy technologies.

For further information, including identified reserves per country, see Also:

Thorium Power Limited

World Nuclear Association - Thorium

UIC - Thorium

US Geological Survey (USGS) - Thorium

Country of Nuclear Strategic Concern - Australia

Good background reading about potential opportunities for Australia with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle in an international context.

From the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Let's focus our energy on a safer future

As reported in The Australian:

Leslie Kemeny

"AUSTRALIAN politicians who wish to minimise the risks of international nuclear proliferation should first promote their nation's full involvement in the international nuclear fuel cycle and endorse the development of an Australian nuclear power industry.

Their main objective should be to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the compliance mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The first five decades of the 21st century will see extensive growth in nuclear power generation worldwide. By 2050 Australians could find that up to one-third of their nation's energy supply will come from nuclear power stations. As well, Australia, already the world's premier coal exporter, will be called on to become the planet's primary suppler of greenhouse-friendly uranium and perhaps thorium. It may also be fully engaged with the global nuclear fuel cycle industry and may join the Nuclear Suppliers Group of nations."