Comparing emissions performance

I found a detailed statistical report [data up through 2007] that some may find interesting.

Without going too deep into statistics [a topic I enjoy, but understand if others do not]; lets just compare Australia to the USA with respect to emission performance. The report contains data going back to the 1970's; but is framed to compare data from 1990 through 2007 as a measurement against the Kyoto Protocol.

So, where to start? "How can a nation of just over 20 million be compared to another with a population 15 times greater?" One way is to level the data. Comparing emissions per unit GDP [per $ made in our economy], per unit of energy supplied, or per capita [per person] are fair means to level the pitch.

So, just looking at total emissions; how did both nations perform?

In 2007, the USA released 5,769 million tonnes of CO2 to Australia's 396 million tonnes. This doesn't sound too bad for Australia, right? But compared to 1990 data, the USA's emissions increased 18.6% while Australia's leapt by 52.5%; not so respectable.

"But, Australia's economy was booming then, population was growing and, while we were building coal and gas stations during that time, the energy industry told us they were super efficient, designed to reduce emissions, right?" Let's see.

The USA's total primary energy supply in 2007 was 97,969 petajoules, up 22% from 1990. Data for Australia is 5,194 petajoules, up 43.9% from 1990. "So what? Australia's energy demand grew faster, but this was necessary to keep pace with the economy, etc." We must compare emissions per unit of energy supplied to determine if this growth was managed responsibly.

So, the USA cranked out 59 tonnes CO2 per each terajoule of energy supplied in 2007. Australia produced 76 tonnes CO2 per terajoule; not good at all. Looking at performance since 1990, Australia's emissions per unit energy supplied grew by 6%,. The USA beat us here as well, cutting their emissions per unit energy supplied by 3%. This means the USA is installing new capacity that generates less emissions to make the same amount of energy, while Australia headed in the opposite direction, actually getting worse. In my opinion, Australia fails the responsibility test.

"Okay, we've lost the efficiency battle, but what about the growth of our economy?"

The USA's 2007 gross domestic product [GDP] was $11,468 billion while Australia's was $667 billion [US dollars equivalent to the value in 2000 - for data of both countries]. Growth from 1990 was 63% for the USA and 81% for Australia. Looking at emissions per unit GDP is a measure of enviro-economic efficiency, i.e. "Can we make money without generating emissions?" The good news is that both nations improved in this area, the bad news is the USA's emissions per unit GDP fell by 27% while Australia's came down only 16%. Bested again.

The final metric for this post is a simple, man-to-man, toe-to-toe size up. Divided into equal shares for each man, woman and child; what is your share of emissions? Sitting in the USA, you were responsible for 19.1 tonnes of CO2 in 2007 [a large number] - down 1.8% from 1990 [but headed in the right direction at least]. Watching the footy in Australia, you cranked out 18.8 tonnes in 2007, up a whopping 23.9% from 1990. Shameful.

I could have cherry-picked a comparison between heavily nuclear France or Sweden. Had I done so, the results would have been even more embarrassing.

Complete details may be found in the OECD/IEA report - CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combustion.

Political Party - Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy Australia

Reportage has posted a very balanced report on a non-aligned, pro-environment, pro-nuclear and pro-renewables Australian political party. Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy - Australia is linked to the international environmental organisation - Environmentalists for Nuclear (or EFN-International).

Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy - Australia

If you have your doubts about Australia's current tack with respect to emissions, you may wish to have a read of the Reportage page and then the EFNE-Australia web page.

Any real chance to significantly deploy (or accelerate the deployment of) no / low carbon emission technologies in Australia will be driven by a continuing shift of public attitudes to the point where they impact the actions of policy makers. Based in the information linked above, EFNE-Australia seems committed to taking tangible, pragmatic action to achieve that end.

If not us, who? If not now, when?

Paper reactors, real reactors - Rickover

I imagine I've frustrated a nuclear advocate or two with a few posts and/or comments in this blog and elsewhere. I further guess that this post could very well fall into the category, but that is not my objective; nor is my intent to point a finger at any person or group in particular other than those specifically called out below. I only wish to point to some wise advice from a very accomplished man. We’re all entitled to our own opinions, but from my perspective, tangible accomplishments (i.e. building something from nothing to solve a significant problem or provide for a great societal need) goes a very long way toward earning my respect and admiration.

That being said, I’d like to share the words of Hyman Rickover. Many US Nuclear Navy servicemen (active, or particularly non-active/retired) love the guy. I’m not that far out on the spectrum, but I do respect his accomplishments as well as his respect for demonstrated achievement.

One of Rickover’s letters (or possibly a congressional testimony) is copied below, word for word and reflects my own experience as an Engineer with a few decades of nuclear industry experience (reactor O&M and capital projects management).

But its relevance goes far beyond the nuclear industry. One can apply academic-practical tests to a number of energy related issues of the day (i.e. the projections / promises of a number of renewable energy advocates vs. the experiences of Germany; clean coal efforts in the USA; etc.).

Next, try to imagine the introduction of politics (i.e. the political low carbon energy deployment plan vs. the practical low carbon energy deployment plan).

Finally, please bear in mind that this letter was written at a time of general nuclear optimism - especially within the general public. In today's context, the same academic-practical disconnect applies equally to those who repeatedly over-inflate nuclear related risk a la Caldicott, Lovins, etc.

June 5, 1953

Important decisions about the future development of atomic power must frequently be made by people who do not necessarily have an intimate knowledge of the technical aspects of reactors. These people are, nonetheless, interested in what a reactor plant will do, how much it will cost, how long it will take to build and how long and how well it will operate. When they attempt to learn these things, they become aware of confusion existing in the reactor business. There appears to be unresolved conflict on almost every issue that arises.

I believe that this confusion stems from a failure to distinguish between the academic and the practical. These apparent conflicts can usually be explained only when the various aspects of the issue are resolved into their academic and practical components. To aid in this resolution, it is possible to define in a general way those characteristics which distinguish the one from the other.

An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose (“omnibus reactor”). (7) Very little development is required. It will use mostly “off-the-shelf” components. (8) The reactor is in the study phases. It is not being built now.

On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated.

The tools of the academic-reactor designer are a piece of paper and a pencil with an eraser. If a mistake is made, it can always be erased and changed. If the practical-reactor designer errs, he wears the mistake around his neck; it cannot be erased. Everyone can see it.

The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects. He is free to luxuriate in the elegant ideas, the practical shortcomings of which can be relegated to the category of “mere technical details.” The practical-reactor designer must live with these same technical details. Although recalcitrant and awkward, they must be solved and cannot be put off until tomorrow. Their solutions require manpower, time and money.

Unfortunately for those who must make far-reaching decisions without the benefit of an intimate knowledge of reactor technology and unfortunately for the interested public, it is much easier to get the academic side of an issue than the practical side. For a large part those involved with the academic reactors have more inclination and time to present their ideas in reports and orally to those who will listen. Since they are innocently unaware of the real but hidden difficulties of their plans, [t]hey speak with great facility and confidence. Those involved with practical reactors, humbled by their experiences, speak less and worry more.

Yet it is incumbent on those in high places to make wise decisions, and it is reasonable and important that the public be correctly informed. It is consequently incumbent on all of us to state the facts as forthrightly as possible. Although it is probably impossible to have reactor ideas labelled as “practical” or “academic” by the authors, it is worthwhile for both the authors and the audience to bear in mind this distinction and to be guided thereby.

Yours faithfully,


H. G. Rickover
Naval Reactors Branch
Division of Reactor Development
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Dr. James Hansen in Melbourne

''I don't intend to be telling Australia what they should do for their energy source except that they can't continue to burn coal without screwing everybody..."

''And exporting coal, and increasing exports of coal, is almost equivalent to being a drug dealer to the world.''

James Hansen, the director of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies

source: the Sydney Morning Herald

Videos on Ionizing radiation

Today, I received a kind Email from a Mr Georg Herlitz, a Swede, who has just completed a project to develop some nuclear information, education and instruction videos of potential interest.

http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=DE82FF9404E57FF3
Swedish version

http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=2F32241381ECC3E7
English version

Thanks for the Email Georg. Your embedded video is also included below.

ROK-on! South Korea

In a recent speech, ANSTO CEO, Dr. Adi Paterson, suggested the global nuclear industry is passing Australia by, and in permitting it to do so, Australia is missing a significant opportunity.

Based on Ian’s comment in the post immediately below, I began to dig around for information on Korea’s nuclear industry. I stumbled upon an August 2009 report, Nuclear Technology and Economic Development in the Republic of Korea. It details the results of Korea’s investments in nuclear infrastructure and human capacity development. Winning recent bids for US $20 billion (possibly $40 billion) in nuclear power plant contacts in the UAE and a research reactor in Jordan are the latest tangible outcomes of their efforts.

A few quotes:

…Over the past four decades, the Republic of Korea has become one of the world’s leading nuclear power countries, with 20 nuclear power plants in commercial operation at the end of 2005, comprising a total generating capacity of 17.5 GW(e). Increasing national participation in the nuclear industry has meant the steadily increased use of locally produced material and domestic staff resources. Meaningful national participation in nuclear power plant construction requires the existence of a capable construction industry; medium and heavy manufacturing including cement, steel, machinery and equipment and chemicals; as well as competency in other services such as civil engineering, quality assurance control and testing; and specialized manpower training including engineering and managerial skills. Domestic industries gradually became the main suppliers to and main contractors for the nuclear power programme…

The industrial sectors that benefited from nuclear power plant construction changed over time as the commercial nature of the construction evolved from imported turn-key plants to greater technological self-sufficiency. For example, before 1990, only two major industrial sectors received significant value added from nuclear power: electric power plant construction, and finance and insurance. After 1990, as the Republic of Korea approached technological self-sufficiency in nuclear power plant construction, the number of sectors affected increased to include primary metal products, general machinery and equipment, electronic and other electric equipment, and business services. The general machinery and equipment sector was the most affected for the years 1990 and 1995, reflecting large expenditures in this sector for new plants.

There are four nuclear power plant sites in Republic of Korea. Each of the host communities has benefited from the construction and operation of these plants. These benefits include tax revenues, financial contributions in terms of local expenditures by the plant for salaries, social contributions and investments, and infrastructure development.

External benefits, like the more familiarly known external costs, are those that the public incurs but that are not included in the cost of production (in the generation cost in the case of nuclear power) and hence are not in the price of the product (electricity). External benefits of nuclear power are thus in a sense by-products of nuclear power generation. Many external benefits often occur in the form of avoided external or even internalized costs. Nuclear power generation, for example, to the extent that it replaces thermal generation, significantly reduces the external costs of air pollution and GHG emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion.

Similarly, nuclear power generation creates benefits in terms of enhanced security of energy supply, and in terms of electricity price stability. Although private investors will make their decisions based largely on internalized costs, government investors and policy makers may wish to make and to affect decisions based on both internalized and external costs. Government decisions can include both public investment and regulatory decisions. With increasing pressure on the environment and human health, regulatory measures increasingly incorporate these externalities in such a way that the external costs are appropriately internalized, i.e., reflected in the cost of production. Governments can thus indirectly affect private investment choices.

No form of energy production or use is without an environmental impact on a life cycle basis. This is true for all energy chains: from extracting resources, building facilities, and transporting material through the final conversion to useful energy services. The traditional air pollutants associated with fossil fuel combustion are principally sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and suspended particulate matter (PM); GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion include most notably CO2 and methane (CH4). Trace elements and heavy metals, like arsenic and mercury are also associated with coal combustion. Nuclear power plants emit virtually none of these air pollutants associated with fossil fuel combustion. Hence, a major environmental benefit of nuclear power is a significant avoidance of the costs associated with both air pollution and GHG emissions.

These avoided external costs can be difficult to quantify and convert to monetary values; any valuation process remains subjective, and results vary across countries. Despite the uncertainties and the national differences in valuation of externalities, however, several major studies have sought to estimate the external costs of air pollution associated with different electricity generating technologies. Perhaps best known is the ExternE project (providing global and standardized assessments) sponsored by the European Union and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the USA. A comparison is provided of the external costs estimated by ExternE over time and for different electricity generating technologies. [see report for graphical data]

…nuclear electricity generating costs are less sensitive to changes in fuel prices than are the costs of fossil fired generation. Although the benefits to the economy of the Republic of Korea of the opportunity for lower electricity prices from nuclear power were not estimated, it was noted that insulation from price volatility — another avoided cost — is a positive benefit of nuclear power. The trebling of uranium prices in 2006–2007 resulted in only a 6–8% difference in nuclear power generating costs, while a doubling of international fossil fuel prices translates into generation cost increases of about 35–45% for coal fired electricity and 70–80% for natural gas. Since the competitiveness of nuclear power depends in part on the economics of fossil fuel alternatives, such rising fossil fuel prices tend to improve nuclear power’s competitive standing.

Conversely, Australia opted not to pursue nuclear technologies at about the same time (~1970s). Based on public comments, there seems to be little chance of policy changes in the near future.

How has that decision worked out for us?

Thrust a spade into Terra Australis and you’ll probably be able to sell the contents. This has led to the development of a wombat economy (dig/sell). Our top 25 Exports in the fiscal year 2008/09 are listed below.

Rank, Commodity ($ billion, % growth from 2007/08)

1 Coal ($54.7, 123.9%) – Fossil Fuel
2 Iron ore & concentrates ($34.2, 66.9%)
3 Gold ($17.5, 42.7%)
4 Education-related travel services ($16.6, 22.7%)
5 Personal travel (excl education) services ($11.7, -2.8%)
6 Natural gas ($10.1, 72.3%) – Fossil Fuel
7 Crude petroleum ($8.3, -14.0%) – Fossil Fuel
8 Aluminium ores & conc (incl alumina) ($6.1, 3.3%)
9 Aluminium ($5.3, -3.9%)
10 Beef, f.c.f. ($5.0, 14.4%)
11 Wheat ($4.9, 71.0%)
12 Professional services ($3.7, 12.2%)
13 Passenger transport services ($3.7, -11.3%)
14 Medicaments (incl veterinary) ($3.6, 1.8%)
15 Copper ores & concentrates ($3.6, -13.4%)
16 Technical & other business services (3.4, -2.6%)
17 Copper ($2.8, -13.9%)
18 Refined petroleum (2.8, -23.3%) – Fossil Fuel
19 Business travel services ($2.7, -0.4%)
20 Passenger motor vehicles ($2.7, -20.8%)
21 Alcoholic beverages ($2.6, -6.9%)
22 Other transportation services ($2.4, -5.7%)
23 Meat (excl beef), f.c.f. ($2.3, 14.1%)
24 Telecom, computer & information services ($2.1, 12.1%)
25 Wool & other animal hair (incl tops) ($2.0, -19.2%)

With respect to our technical / industrial capacity, what does Australia manufacture that significantly contributes to our economy via large scale exports? Where is there evidence of sustained technological innovation or engineering excellence (large production volumes at sustained high quality and competitive cost)? Apparently, not much. Removing services, agricultural products, basic and raw materials leaves:

14 Medicaments
18 Refined petroleum
20 Passenger motor vehicles
21 Alcoholic beverages

Looking beyond our wombat like export tendencies, the Australian economy is heavily service oriented. Professional and Technical Services ranks very high in the value added list of Australian business sectors. Examine Australian business data (MS Excel) from the Australian Bureau of Statistics; not much requiring cutting-edge global technology leadership or robust industrial capacity; not much to counter the points made by Adi Paterson.

Australia is a country with many people who 'know', whereas the Koreans are a people who 'do'. Coincidentally, humanity stands at the dawn of a period in our collective history where an unprecedented amount of complex and highly technical work needs to get 'done'. With 40 years of demonstrated nuclear expertise, Korea seems well positioned to take advantage of a sizable opportunity.

Options for Australia's first NPP

Should Australia decide to price carbon emissions at a level where power producers begin to shift significantly away from fossil fuels, nuclear power will become economically competitive in Australia. Assuming this shift begins within the next five years and Australia does opt for nuclear power, we will construct an established Gen-III/III+ design, imported from a long time ally.

Why import?

For the same reason the HIFAR research reactor was imported fifty-some years ago (British DIDO design), the OPAL reactor was imported about ten years ago (INVAP / Argentina) and ANSTO's PETNET design was imported more recently. Australia does not have large-scale nuclear (NSSS, and nuclear A&E) design capability. Such capabilities are developed over decades. It could be done in Australia (or most other countries for that matter), but if energy supply and emissions reductions are the goal - such development is not on the optimised path.

However, Australia has recently and repeatedly demonstrated our ability to manage and implement large-ish nuclear projects with regard to project implementation and independent regulatory oversight. We have also demonstrated our ability to safely, reliably and efficiently operate and maintain nuclear facilities.

Established?

When nuclear power is cost competitive with other generation options, our uniquely Australian political challenges will remain. Opting for a design that has been built and operated several times in different countries provides a necessary degree of assurance against politically motivated claims of unknown costs, safety risks, or questions about operational reliability. Attempting to develop an unproven design here would expose would be investors to the associated unknowns of schedule delays, cost overruns or performance uncertainties. It is for this reason that nuclear design endeavours are usually scaled up through a series of increasingly larger demonstration projects.

An established design also brings with it prior regulatory approvals. This is not to imply a guarantee of Australian approval, but does provide added confidence in the review process.

Why an ally?

Consider the political baggage if Australia selected a Russian reactor design. Add to this the history of Russia using energy security as an instrument of foreign policy (every reactor requires a secure supply of highly technical spare parts for decades).

Furthermore, regulatory review and approval experience with a given design in the USA, Canada, the UK, Japan, Korea, etc. could reassure potential investors of our ability to adequately manage project implementation risks (i.e. schedule and cost control).

Why Gen-III/III+?

First, I've listed it as "III/III+" because the line between the two can be blurred depending on where you look. The designs I refer to include (not meant to be exhaustive and listed alphabetically by company):

• AECL - CANDU-6
• AREVA - EPR
• Atomstroyexport - AES92 (VVER-V392)
• GE-Hitachi-Toshiba - ABWR and ESBWR (without Toshiba)
• KHNP - APR-1400
• MHI - APWR
• Westinghouse - AP-1000.

Some are operating today, others are being built and the rest are being marketed. The list may grow as other companies / countries enter the international nuclear power plant supply market (AECL's ACR-1000, B&W's mPower, China's CAP-1000, etc.); but these GenIII/III+ newcomers will take some time to pass the 'established' test and therefore are beyond the scope of this post.

Next, as I've explained above, the design must be established. I fully support advanced nuclear research and development. I believe Australia should waste no time increasing its involvement in such efforts. However, the scope of this post is directed and the near-term displacement of fossil energy generation. And therefore, established, shovel-ready designs are required.

With respect to fast / Gen-IV reactors; the OECD produced an excellent report - Nuclear Development Strategic and Policy Issues Raised by the Transition from Thermal to Fast Nuclear Systems (88 pages, ISBN 9789264060654). In this report and several others, 2040 is projected as an estimated time frame of fast reactor deployment. The report details other challenges such as prerequisite infrastructure requirements that make Australia seem unlikely as a location for early Gen-IV deployment.

Gen-IV's likely time-line strengthens Australia's case for Gen-III/III+.

Our impressively nuclear neighbours

Last week Reuters reported the start of the 912 megawatt Tomari-3 reactor in Japan's far north. According to the IAEA PRIS database, construction of this reactor began on 18-November-2004. So the duration of this project was roughly 5 years. The reactor went critical back in March and has been in commissioning since that time according to WNN. Different media reports state that this is the first new reactor to come into service in Japan for 3 years, that it will cut Japan's carbon-dioxide emissions by 20% of 1990 levels and that this is the last Gen II reactor planned. All future reactors are to be Gen III or beyond. This plant has received approval to irradiate MOX fuel.

Also in the news is Korea's win of a UAE power reactor project (US $20 bn for 4 reactors, with the possibility for $20 bn more in the future) as well as a US $173 million new research reactor project in Jordan.

Seems as if the nuclear business continues to thrive in Asia - and is quite lucrative at that.

Meanwhile

Australia's total coal exports for 2008-09 were $54.6 bn (~ US $50 bn) according to DFAT. This was an increase of 123.6% from the previous year. [Regarding the politicising of efforts to cut emissions and the impact on Australia's coal industry, I would be thrilled if we could just get to zero growth.]

Our uranium exports totalled $990 million, up 11.6% from the previous year. Ranking number 28 of all Australian exports, uranium sales contribute 0.4% of our total export revenue. [Coal is ranked number 1 and accounts for 23.7% of all exports.]

An endless coal train (~100 tonnes per car)

In 2009, a growing number of high profile media reports highlighted Australia's high per-capita carbon emissions.

Australian emissions were fairly unfazed by the GFC due to increasing demand and the decline in renewables generation with falling Snowy Hydro output (the result of prolonged drought). [The growth in other renewables sectors, efficiency or conservation programmes will have to accelerate to account for the fall in hydro generation before they will displace any emissions from fossil generation.]

4,000 MWe of fossil fuelled generation in being progressed in NSW.

sus·tain·able (sə stān′ə bəl) adjective
1. capable of being sustained
2. a) designating, of, or characterized by a practice that sustains a given condition, as economic growth or a human population, without destroying or depleting natural resources, polluting the environment, etc. sustainable agriculture
2. b) governed or maintained by, or produced as a result of, such practices sustainable growth

OECD - Nuclear Energy in Perspective

The OECD has released an informative nuclear energy summary, Nuclear Energy and Addressing Climate Change. The document is only 8 pages (with figures and tables), but it efficiently addresses the following questions:

• Does nuclear power produce CO2 emissions?


• To what extent is nuclear energy used now?


• Can nuclear power capacity be expanded quickly?


• Are supplies of nuclear fuel adequate?


• What about safety, waste and proliferation concerns?

Action (and nuclear) still required

As reported by the ABC, a typical Australian emits more carbon than any other person in the developed world. We are setting a very dangerous example and worse providing very low hanging fruit for any country or political leader seeking justification to strive for our comfortable lifestyle via increased emissions. We have a moral and ethical obligation to take significant action to reduce our emissions, in addition to the climate signals repeatedly knocking on our door.

From an April 2007 UN meeting (What's happened since then?)

The ABC report does contain some seemingly good news; that emissions have dipped slightly due to the financial crisis. However, this may provide a false sense of security and is certainly no cause for celebration for anyone expecting serious cuts by 2020, 2030 and/or 2050.

Emissions per unit GDP (carbon intensity) is another relevant metric. According to the US Government, Energy Information Administration, Australia / New Zealand’s carbon intensity ranks third in the OECD (behind Canada and South Korea). One wonders how Australia’s ranking would move if we were judged on our own. Carbon intensity is dropping, but if tangible action is not completed to reduce it further along with emission cuts per capita (i.e. if ‘real’ emissions are not cut considerably), any economic recovery will stress the climate via emissions increases.

If one reviews the two tables within the EIA page linked above, it can be seen that emissions per unit GDP continue to decrease – China and India are the best performers, as one would hope. However, emissions per person actually increase out to 2030 – here China is the worst performer and Australia/New Zealand only drops by 0.2%. However, both GDP and population increase over that time. Therefore, real emissions will increase in Australia and around the world; which in turn will lead to climate disaster according to Hansen, Brook and many, many others.

And there is tangible evidence that our real emissions will indeed rise. It can’t be any clearer than the two large fossil energy projects currently proposed in NSW. If these plants go forward, it will mark a significant failure to seriously cut Australian emissions. Their mere proposal should be a wake up call to anyone genuinely interested in climate change, emission cuts or Australian leadership in the upcoming climate negotiations. Australian energy policy falls short of delivering the energy security our economy requires and emission reductions we are obligated to achieve; for Australians at home and the world at large.

A serious national debate on holistic approaches to significantly cut our emissions is desperately needed. The debate must go beyond the fulfilment of campaign promises and it must recognise and address the risks posed from climate change – particularly for Australia. These risks must be compared in an objective and balanced context against those of nuclear power.

For example, climate scientist and blogger Prof Barry Brook is linking recent weather events to climate change. Consider that just one Australian bushfire resulted in over 3 times the fatalities than the immediate impact of the worst ever nuclear accident at Chernobyl (a flawed design that would never be built today). Furthermore, within a typical 5 year period, deaths from coal mining accidents in China alone exceed the projected long term death count from Chernobyl. One must question the true aim of modern anti-nuclear campaigners who seemingly care about public safety at home or abroad.

Nuclear waste issues are indeed a challenge that must be addressed, but the world has repeatedly demonstrated the ease of storing high level spent waste in interim facilities until permanent solutions can be implemented. The good news here is that there is really no rush, unlike action to curb emissions which is becoming more urgent with the passage of time. There is also the very real possibility that spent nuclear fuel could be consumed as a fuel source in fourth generation reactors.

Certainly, proliferation must be managed. This need has been recognised by both the Rudd and Obama administrations, among others. Collaborative efforts have been stepped up in recent years as has the IAEA budget in line with calls for enhanced nuclear security by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Again, fourth generation reactors include a prerequisite design criteria to mitigate proliferation risk through either the consumption of plutonium or the blending of high radiation fission products into the fuel to make physical protection an inherent property of the fuel.

Economic anti-nuclear arguments (too expensive, too long) often conviently assume nuclear as a stand-alone emissions reduction technology as opposed to one of a suite of technologies deployed in parallel between now and 2050. In Australia, we have been led to believe we are ‘blessed’ with renewable, conservation and efficiency options that are more rapidly and more cost effectively deployed. Great! Then deploy them and let’s get those two fossil projects in NSW cancelled.

Without tangible evidence that non-nuclear actions will achieve the necessary cuts, the allocation of additional resources to the problem is justified. There is evidence from, say large renewable deployment efforts in Europe, to suggest a non-nuclear strategy challenges the ability of a nation to achieve significant emissions cuts (see this story on anti-nuclear Austria’s Kyoto target performance vs. its EU peers).

With respect to the timing, there is additional evidence that nuclear project implementation performance improves with experience. Citing the current projects in Finland and France is counterproductive since they are early implementations of a First-of-a-kind third generation design. As experience is gained, the implementation of this design will improve just as second generation design project performance has over the past few decades, particularly in Korea and Japan. For more details on modern nuclear plant construction – refer to this post.

The justification to keep nuclear power off the table in Australia is simply not there. In fact there is considerable, objective evidence to the contrary.